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 Abstract 
The impact of the great recession on inequality is unclear. Because the crises in the 
housing and stock markets and mass job loss affect incomes from across the entire distribution, 
the overall impact on inequality is difficult to determine. Early speculation using a variety of 
narrow measures of earnings, income and consumption yield contradictory results. In this paper, 
we develop new estimates of income inequality based on ‘more complete income’ (MCI), which 
augments standard income measures with those that are accrued from the ownership of wealth. 
We use the 1989-2007 Surveys of Consumer Finances, and also construct MCI measures for 
2009 based on projections of assets, income, and earnings.  
We investigate the level and trend in MCI inequality and compare it to other estimates of 
overall and ‘high incomes’ in the literature. Compared to standard measures of income, MCI 
suggests higher levels of inequality and slightly larger increases in inequality over time. Several 
MCI-based inequality measures peaked in 2007 at their highest levels in twenty years. The 
combined impact of the “great recession” on the housing, stock, and labor markets after 2007 has 
reduced some measures of income inequality at the top of the MCI distribution. Despite 
declining from the 2007 peak, however, inequality remains as high as levels experienced earlier 
in the decade, and much higher than most points over the last twenty years. In the middle of the 
income distribution, the declines in income from wealth after 2007 were the result of diminished 
value of residential real estate; at the top of the distribution declines in the value of business 
assets had the greatest impact.  
We also assess the level and trend in the functional distribution of income between 
capital and labor, and find a rising share of income accruing to real capital or wealth from 1989 
to 2007. The recent economic crisis has diminished the capital share back to levels from 2004. 
Contrary to the findings of other researchers, we find that the labor share of income among high-

















  2I. Introduction  
This paper is an attempt to capture the effects of secular and cyclical forces on the 
inequality of income across Americans who are suffering through the “Great Recession” of 
December 2007 and still ongoing (NBER, 2010). A full accounting of inequality in this period 
will have to wait years, as impacts of the recession and its aftermath are still unfolding, and the 
necessary data will not be available until 2011. The most current micro-data that can be used to 
analyze income distribution are from calendar year (CY) 2008 (Current Population Survey [CPS] 
income or poverty), or CY 2007 (Survey of Consumer Finances [SCF] wealth).  
Based on currently available data, however, we do know quite a lot about some of the 
economic hardships resulting from the recession. Between December 2007 and March 2010, the 
US lost 8.6 million jobs, and unemployment rose from 4.9 to 9.7 percent. The incidence of job 
loss has been particularly severe among young workers, and those with lower levels of education 
Total employment declined by less than five percent, but among teens it has fallen 20 percent 
and among those with high school degrees or less it has declined 7 percent (Engemann and Wall, 
2009).  Forecasts based on available employment and food stamp data indicate that poverty will 
likely rise in 2009 and 2010 (Monea and Sawhill, 2009).  
Expected changes in the distribution of income in 2009, and beyond, though, are not as 
clear. Past recessions (excepting the Great Depression of the 1930s) tended to hurt people at the 
bottom of the distribution to a greater extent than people at the top (Atkinson, 2009). These 
effects are and were tempered by the safety net, and are driven by the loss of labor market 
earnings, which recovers when employment recovers. However, a major aspect of the current 
recession has been the drop in property income values, financial assets, and home prices, as well 
as employment losses. Because all parts of the income distribution have suffered losses of 
income and wealth, the impacts on the overall distribution are more difficult to determine.  
  3Preliminary analysis and speculation over shifts in the distribution suggests a range of 
potential outcomes. There is some evidence that the collapse in the stock housing markets have 
produced declining CEO pay, lower dividends, and reduced Wall Street bonuses, which could 
cause the income gap to shrink “at the expense of the wealthy” (Davis and Frank, 2009; 
Leonhardt and Fabrikant, 2009). Looking to data on consumption, some researchers have found 
evidence of declining inequality between 2006 and 2009 (Meyer and Sullivan, 2010; Heathcote 
et al. 2010a, 2010b, and; Parker and Vissing, 2009). Much of that decline is attributable to a 
notable drop in consumption at the top of the distribution, partially reversed in 2009 as the 
Obama ARRA plan boosted durables spending and the stock market recovery took hold (Parker 
and Vissing, 2009; Petev, Pistaferri, and Saporta, 2010). Overall consumption still fell in 2008 
and 2009 combined, but the change in inequality is less certain once we look at the 2009 and 
early 2010 data.  
Early indicators from some standard income inequality measures from the Census 
Bureau, however, suggest that high income shares, as well as Gini and Theil indices, rose 
between 2007 and 2008 (Census, 2009). The major losses in income, in proportional terms, were 
experienced by the 80
th and 10
th percentiles, with relatively smaller losses for the 90
th percentile 
(Smeeding and Thompson, 2010). These findings are fully consistent with those of Krueger et al. 
(2010) and Heathcote et al. (2010a, 2010b), who also find earnings and disposable income 
inequality rising secularly in rich countries and also in recessions, including this recession 
(Heathcote et al., 2010b) and especially for bottom income units. Because of top-coding in the 
Current-Population Survey, though, these data can tell us little about what is going on at the very 
top of the distribution. 
Data with broad measures of income and that also contain detailed information for 
households at the very top of the distribution, are not yet available to give an updated 
  4understanding of inequality. The Congressional Budget Office “tax burden” series, for example, 
are only available up through 2007 (CBO, 2009). Similarly, the Survey of Consumer Finances as 
well as the IRS tax data used in analysis of high incomes are only available through 2007 
(Smeeding and Thompson, 2010; Piketty and Saez, 2006). But, as Burkhauser, et al (2009) show 
- using non-top coded Census Income data - most of the change in income inequality over the 
past decade has been amongst the rich. However, even these data exclude the vast majority of 
capital income—the issue to which we now turn. 
In the remainder of this paper, we will: first, briefly review some of the different 
approaches to analyzing trends in income distribution; second; describe our method for 
calculating a “more complete” measure of income (MCI), third, compare levels and trends – for 
recent years and across the last couple of decades – for inequality using MCI and other standard 
income measures, fourth, describe the impact of using MCI on the trends in capital vs. labor 
shares, and finally, discuss some potentially policy implications of these trends.  
The MCI income concept – based on Haig-Simons income estimated using Survey of 
Consumer Finance data – results in higher income across the distribution, but especially at the 
top end. We also find a greater trend toward income concentration at the top of the distribution 
using MCI than do other analysts. A number of standard measures of inequality using MCI 
peaked in 2007, after rising relatively steadily since 1989, including the Gini index, the 99/50 
ratio, and the income shares of top 1 percent and next 4 percent. Nearly all of the increase in 
inequality is the result of large gains at the very top of the distribution, with little evidence of 
rising inequality at the bottom of the distribution. The great recession has halted, temporarily at 
least, the trend toward greater inequality. Any declines, however, have so far been modest, 
leaving inequality as high as any point before the 2007 peak.  
  5We also assess the level and trend in the functional distribution of income between 
capital and labor. We find that properly measured, the labor share is closer to 55 percent of total 
income than the 75 percent that is sometimes claimed. The results using MCI suggest that, 
contrary to the findings of Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006), the capital share of income at the top 
of the income distribution has risen in recent decades (as also found cross nationally by Glynn, 
2009). By 2007, income from capital accounted for more than half of MCI among the top few 
percentiles of the income distribution. 
 
II. Approaches to Understanding Inequality and the Distribution of Income  
For some time there has been widespread concern about growing inequality in the 
distribution of household income in the United States. The US Census Bureau shows the Gini 
index of household income rose from .40 to .47 between 1967 and 2008, and that the ratio of 
incomes of households at the 90
th and 10
th percentiles of the income distribution rose from 9.2 to 
11.4 over the same period. And while there is a general consensus among researchers that 
income inequality has increased in the United States and much of the rest of the world 
(Brandolini and Smeeding, 2009), there is less agreement over how much it has increased, or 
whether income is even the most important factor in understanding inequality, let alone the 
causes of the increase.     
Labor economists have shown that inequality in hourly wages increased considerably 
over the same period (Autor et al, 2008). With earnings representing the single largest portion of 
household income, some argue that trends in earnings inequality are the key factor behind 
inequality in the US income distribution.
1 A number of recent provocative studies highlight the 
role of extremely high earnings among “superstars,” CEOs, athletes, rock stars, and celebrities 
                                                 
1 See Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2006; Katz, 2006; Lemieux et al., 2007; Lemieux, 2006; Cowen, 2007. 
  6(Kaplan and Rauh (2010); Walker (2005), and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2005)), but these 
papers are only able to identify about 25-30 percent of even the highest income earners.  
And, labor income in the form of wages had declined to 50.2 percent of national income 
by the third quarter of 2006 – a 50-year low as a share of national income (Aron-Dine and 
Shapiro, 2006; Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2010; Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005). Even after 
adding together labor income (even including supplements or employee benefits) and corporate 
profits, which peaked at 13.7 percent of total national income in the third quarter of 2006 after 
rising for three decades, there is still more than a fifth of the nation’s economic pie missing. 
Other uncounted components of National Income such as net interest, proprietor’s income and 
rental incomes are largely missing from micro date based income distribution calculations (see 
Table 1).  
Meyer and Sullivan (2010) argue that levels of income inequality are not as great as 
suggested by the Census Bureau, and that the emphasis on income itself is misplaced. With 
appropriate adjustments for household size, taxes, and transfers, Meyer and Sullivan (2010) 
show that the 90/10 ratio was 5.3 in 2008, up from 4.1 in 1979. More important, they argue, is 
that consumption is a better proxy for well-being or even permanent income than the income 
measures used in most of the inequality research (Also see Slesnick (1994, 2001.)) Consumption 
inequality has showed no trends toward greater inequality in recent decades, and has – as 
mentioned above – declined in the last few years.  
Consumption is a strong predictor of different measures of hardship (Meyer and Sullivan, 
2003), but it is deficient in some important respects as a measure of well-being. As Dickens’ 
famous line suggests, it might be better to treat the debt-financed consumption of many low-
income households whose consumption far exceeds their income as a measure of hardship rather 
than well-being:  
  7“Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure nineteen six, result happiness. 
Annual income twenty pounds, annual expenditure twenty pound ought and six, 
result misery.” 
- David Copperfield 
 
And by focusing on the 90
th percentile of the distribution, much of the consumption-oriented 
research misses what is going on at the very top of distribution.  
Several analysts have suggested that most, if not all, of the gains in incomes from rapidly 
expansion of productivity in the 1990 and early 2000s accrued to the richest 1-5 percent of 
Americans (Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2005; Piketty and Saez, 2003; 2006).
2 This result is 
supported by the analysis of top-coded Census Income data by Burkhauser, et al (2009). The 
long-term analysis by Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2009) shows that since the early 1970s 
income growth among the top five percent (particularly the top one percent) has far outpaced the 
rest of the nation.  
Even in micro data that accurately reflect affluent households (Piketty and Saez, 2006; 
CBO, 2009), however, the annual income measures only include the flow realized from wealth 
(capital) in any one year.
3 In addition, the higher one goes in the income or earnings distribution, 
the more likely one is to find high rates of turnover in top incomes from year to year. Indeed, 
advocates of high American income mobility point out that the top 1 percent of income earners 
have 70 percent turnover rates year-to-year (Cox and Alm, 1999).  
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that powerful income recipients can choose the 
form and timeframe in which their compensation is paid, e.g., for tax reasons (Auten and Carroll, 
1999; Gruber and Saez, 2002). For instance, the two founders of Google, in a widely reported 
press story, took $1 each in earnings in 2005. Of course, each one also exercised much less 
                                                 
2 Only a few recent analysts doubt there has been a widespread increase in inequality that can be generally attributed 
to the growth of high incomes (Reynolds, 2007; Tatom, 2007; but see critiqued in Burtless, 2007).  
3 Unearned income from transfers, public and private, also accrues but account for under 10 percent of incomes. 
  8highly taxed stock options, which left them with $1.0 billion or more in ‘asset incomes’ in that 
year (Ackerman, 2006). Whether for reasons of tax and estate planning, or simple accumulation, 
the large majority of the gains from wealth, are not realized annually.
4  
The question we address is in this paper is how to add this income to household 
distributional micro-data, and determine to whom did this property or capital income accrue? 
The key to pulling these disparate sources and trends in economic well being together is a more 
full accounting of annual income from wealth, whether realized or not. Indeed, we believe that 
much of what has been interpreted as “consumption from wealth” is not drawing down wealth 
stocks at all, but comes from spending out of accretions to wealth (see Love and Smith, 2007, for 
older households; and Sierminska and Takhtamanova, 2006, for an international comparison). 
Similarly, the declines in US savings rates over many years leading up to the recession were 
largely composed of spending from accumulated assets, especially owned homes and other 
appreciating assets. While the run-up in home values and dividends received through 2007 fueled 
consumer spending (e.g. Baker, et al, 2006), steep declines in housing values since have 
diminished consumption due to a decrease in wealth stocks (Glick and Lansing, 2010) and the 
savings rate has risen. Clearly, wealth increasingly matters for consumption as well as for 
income. 
The idea of accounting for income from wealth as well as income from earnings and 
other sources is not new (see Weisbrod and Hansen, 1968; Taussig, 1973), and has been used 
recently by Wolff and Zacharias (2006; 2006b) and Haveman, et al., (2006) in some fashion, to 
                                                 
4 The sporadic realization of growing incomes from wealth in both the personal and corporate sector, has led to 
serious miss-estimates of both individual and corporate income tax revenues at the federal and state level for the past 
decade, and especially in recent years (e.g., Schwabish, 2006, CBO, 2006a; 2006b; 2006b; Orszag 2007). 
  9study inequality trends in the 1980s and 1990s.
5 Nevertheless, it is clearly time for a reappraisal 
given recent seismic changes in overall labor and capital income flows. 
 
II. Income Theory and Methodology 
There are many definitions of personal (macro) and household (micro) income from both 
a “sources” and “uses” perspective. According to the most popular theoretical measure of 
income, the Haig-Simons (H-S) income definition, income (I) is equal to consumption (C) and 
the change in net worth (∆NW) realized over the income accounting period. So defined, H-S 
income is a measure of potential consumption or the amount one could consume without 
changing one’s total net worth (one’s stock of assets or debts). Thus according to a “uses “of 
income definition:  
(1)   I = C + ∆NW 
From the functional or “sources” side of income, we can arrive at the same measure by 
adding together income from earnings (E, including self-employment income), income from 
capital (KI, including capital gains plus other income from wealth), plus net transfers (NT, which 
includes those received minus those paid, whether private or public in nature), resulting in the 
following definition: 
(2)   I = E + KI + NT 
If we ignore NT for now, and divide self-employment income, into income from labor and 
capital, we are left with the macroeconomists’ functional distribution of income. 
                                                 
5 Wolff and Zacharias (2006, 2007) and Haveman, et al. (2006; 2007) use an annuity-based measure of inequality 
that assumes that all persons, including high income-high wealth persons consume all wealth before they die. Such 
measures imply the need for assumptions on discount rates, life expectancy and other variables, and they therefore 
assume no bequest or inter-vivos transfer behaviors and they ignore the observed behavior of the rich (e.g. see 
Goolsbee, 2007; Carroll, 2000). We prefer a less challenging and more straightforward estimate of income from 
wealth using current and long run rates of return on existing assets. This seems closer to Haig Simons income in 
terms of capacity to consume, without the extra baggage entailed with the annuity estimates which necessarily 
suggest higher incomes for much older persons, by design 
  10The key element that is included above but largely missing in most estimates of both 
micro and macro estimates of income distribution is the distribution of income from capital. 
Despite long-standing interest in labor and capital “factor shares,” macroeconomists (e.g., 
Goldfarb and Leonard, 2005; Guscina, 2006) and microeconomists who study distribution are 
both seemingly content with using data where only a small fraction of income from capital is 
measured. Interest, rent and dividends received are reported in most micro data based income 
definitions such as the one used by the Census Bureau. Capital gains and losses (KG, including 
those from realized stock options) and royalties, are counted in other income definitions such as 
that used by the CBO (2009) and by Federal Reserve Bank in the SCF income distribution 
measure.
6 
However, the large majority of capital income (KI) accrues to persons but is never 
realized (and is therefore not counted in any given year). This includes imputed rental flows for 
owner occupied housing; business savings in the form of corporate and non-corporate retained 
earnings; and unrealized capital gains. Much of this income stays with the firm that utilizes 
capital and is not realized by the owners of these assets (except as it is reflected the value of their 
enterprise, either self owned or as shares of corporate stock). 
Thus, we define ‘more complete income’ (or MCI) as follows. We retain earnings and net 
transfers (E, NT), and maintain that portion of capital income (KI) received as capital gains and 
royalties (KG). But we then subtract reported interest, rent and dividends (IRD) while adding 
back in an imputed return to all forms of net worth, or “imputed capital income” (IKI). Thus, we 
                                                 
6 Indeed Pryor (2007) attests to the importance of interest rent and dividends in resizing economic inequality using 
the PSID. 
  11impute interest rent and dividends to owners of assets and forego the amounts actually reported 
by respondents.
7 This produces: 
(3)   MCI=E+ NT+ (KG –IRD + IKI) 
Indeed this more complete definition of capital income (KI, below) comes close to measuring the 
concept of ‘∆NW’ that intrigued both Haig and Simons: 
(4)   KI= KG –IRD + IKI  
MCI is an incomplete concept of income as we are unable to measure such items as 
employer benefits, pension fund accruals not counted as personal wealth such as defined benefit 
pension plans (though pension flows for elders are counted as transfers received), or unrealized 
stock options and other promised contractual benefits (‘golden parachutes’) which are not yet 
exercised or received.
8  
Developing More Complete Income (MCI) estimates with the SCF  
  We calculate MCI using the Survey of Consumer Finances, a nationally representative, 
triennial survey that includes an over-sample of wealthy households that are underrepresented in 
most standard surveys. The SCF contains high quality, detailed information on household assets 
as well as income.
9 There are 16 broad asset classes, including stocks, bonds, mutual funds, 
                                                 
7 Reported interest, rent and dividends in the CPS is barely more than half the aggregate amount which other data 
suggests ought to be reported (CBO, 2006b; US Census Bureau, 2005). The decision to keep realized capital gains in 
the base income distribution estimates may seem like double counting. But, gains realized in year X, emerge as 
assets in year X + 1 to the extent they are not consumed. These assets earn a return that should also be counted in 
income in year X. In any case, this decision to include or exclude realized capital gains has a negligible effect on the 
results presented here. 
8 Assets in defined benefit pensions are problematic both because of the potential not to be collected and because of 
back loading in benefit determination. We are less worried about the distributional consequences because most such 
pensions accrue to the top end of the income distribution and therefore do not affect lower incomes. Our analyses 
also ignore non-cash public sector benefits such as those provided by health, education, and the taxes used to pay for 
them (see Garfinkel, et al, 2006, on the latter). While these benefits are especially important for low income persons, 
they pale in comparison to the levels of imputed income from assets for the large majority of households, especially 
middle and high income units. Hence, while MCI helps us better understand the impact and importance of residual 
wealth and the way it affects public and private finances and inequality, it does not represent a complete accounting 
of all flows of income from all sources.  
9 The sample size for the surveys conducted in 2006, 2003 and 2001 was approximately 4,500 households, a slight 
increase over that in previous years. 
  12home-equity, residential real estate, and business assets, as well six broad classes of debt. The 
data include an income definition (SCF income) that is broader than the standard Census money 
income definition. SCF income includes wages, self-employment and business income, taxable 
and tax-exempt interest, dividends, realized capital gains, food stamps and other support 
programs provided by the government, pension income and withdrawals from retirement 
accounts, Social Security income, alimony, and other support payments, and miscellaneous 
sources of income.
10  
  Income net wealth (“income less capital”) is calculated by subtracting realized income 
from capital from the SCF income definition. Hence, reported interest, rents and dividends are 
excluded in the given income year. Further, capital gains and royalties are also excluded in 
counting income “less capital” to avoid double counting, as we will be imputing returns to these 
assets to the extent that gains and royalties in one year have been invested in other assets by the 
next. To the extent that these gains and royalties are consumed and not re-invested, we will 
underestimate capital incomes in this process. 
After removing income from capital from SCF income, flows to assets are imputed for 
the full range of assets measured in the SCF data. In calculating the implicit return on various 
assets, we employ two techniques: first we apply “short term” (3 year) average rates of return to 
22 specific asset/debt types in each of our 8 income years; and then also “long run” 30 year 
average returns over the entire period.
11 These long run rates allow us to separate more 
                                                 
10 Household weights contained in the SCF data are used in all of the calculations. 
11 Other analysts have described the limitations of standard measures of income for welfare and inequality analysis, 
and proposed solutions by supplementing income with wealth, as much as a half-century ago. Weisbrod and Hansen 
(1968) and Taussig (1973) added the annuity value of net-worth to current income to develop measures they 
respectively called “income-net worth” and “comprehensive income.” In more recent work, Wolff and Zacharias 
(2006) and Goolsbee, (2007) use the annuity approach for non-housing wealth and impute rental income for 
homeowners. There are a number of additional differences between the approach used in this paper and the one used 
by Wolff and Zacharias (WZ). WZ use SCF for 1983-2001, we use data for 1989-2007. WZ do not conduct any 
after-tax analysis. For their inequality measures, WZ rely primarily on the Gini index and income shares of different 
percentile groupings (top 10%, top 1%, etc.) We use Ginis as well, but rely primarily on ratios of key percentiles of 
  13permanent long run returns from more volatile short run changes, and to assess more smooth 
trends in income from assets. They also allow us to test the sensitivity of our results to various 
assumed rates of return.  
Separate rates of return were calculated for stocks, bonds, and housing assets, based, 
respectively, on the Dow Jones Industrial Average, 10-year US Treasury notes, and the House 
Price Index of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). In addition, flows to assets are 
calculated gross of the inflation rate (CPI-U), while some flows are based on the average of two 
different types of return (the average of the return to stocks and bonds, for example).  The actual 
rates used to impute these flows are included in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. The complete details 
on the construction of MCI, including how taxes are calculated for the various components of 
MCI so that we can create pre-tax as well as after-tax inequality measures, are provided in the 
Technical Appendix.
12  
The following additive series of combined capital income flows are added to income, net 
of reported interest rent and dividends, in the order specified below: 
•  “plus finance” adds imputed flows to directly held stocks, stock mutual funds, 
combination mutual funds, bonds, other bond mutual funds, savings bonds, government 
bond mutual funds, and tax free bond mutual funds, as well as “other managed assets,” 
such as trusts and annuities to “income less capital”; 
•  “plus retire” adds flows to “quasi-liquid retirement accounts,” such as IRA/Keoghs and 
account-type pensions to “plus finance”; 
•  “plus home” adds flows to owner-occupied home equity to “plus retire”; 
•  “plus oth invest” adds flows to investment real estate equity, transaction accounts, 
certificates of deposit (CDs) and the cash value of whole life insurance to “plus home”; 
•  “plus business” adds flows to other business assets and vehicles―only vehicles worth 
more than $50,000―to “plus oth invest”; 
                                                                                                                                                             
the income distribution (99/50, 95/50, 99/90, etc.) because we find that the biggest impact from using the more 
complete income approach is found at the very highest income levels and does not have as great of an impact in the 
Gini. In contrast to prior annuity approaches, WZ assign different rates of return to the different asset types that they 
annuitize. These rates are long-run returns covering 1960-2000, and generally based on federal Flow of Funds data.  
12 We take no account of the amounts of income, which might have been shifted from a heavily taxed form, 
earnings, to another less heavily taxed form, capital gains or dividends, for instance (Lemieux, et. al., 2007). 
  14•  MCI subtracts flows to non real estate debt, including credit card debt, installment loans, 
and other debt from “plus business”―after replacing observations, where “plus 
business” value incomes were below SCF income with the SCF income value. 
 
Separate estimates for each of these income concepts are created using both long-run (30-year) 
averages and short-run (3-year) time specific rates. The long-run rates are based on the average 
annual return between 1977 and 2007, with the same long run rate applied to each year of SCF 
data―1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and projections of the data into 2009. 
  We also explore an alternative treatment of the vehicle assets, computing a service flow 
to vehicle ownership, following Slesnick (1994).
13 We consider how modifying treatment of this 
asset which is particularly important for middle and low-income households influences levels 
and trends in inequality. 
Projecting SCF into 2009 
  The next round of the SCF (the eventual SCF 2010) will reflect economic conditions in 
2009, but will not available until early 2011. Since the economy entered into a deep recession 
after 2007, heavily impacting earnings as well as stock markets and housing values, the portrait 
of inequality in the most recently available data cannot be expected to reflect current conditions. 
In order to present estimates of inequality that reflect the impacts of the “great recession,” we 
have projected the data from 2007 SCF data into 2009. These projections are based on income 
data from the BEA National Income and Product Accounts, asset data from the Federal Reserve 
Board Flow of Funds data, and earnings data from the Current Population Survey.  
The income and asset categories used to calculate MCI are adjusted according to the 
percent change observed in these same categories between the last two quarters of 2007 and 
2009. The changes by income and asset category, and the detailed source of each are displayed in 
Appendix Table 2A. Changes over this period for the stock market reflect not just the decline in 
                                                 
13 See also ERS (2010). 
  15the total market capitalization that started at the end of 2007, but some of the rebound in market 
value since the first quarter of 2009. Changes in annual earnings are allowed to vary by 
education and industry class, reflecting – at least in part – how the labor markets of different 
demographic groups have been impacted by the “great recession,” as described by Engemann 
and Wall (2009).
14 The earnings measures in the SCF are adjusted based changes in total weekly 
earnings between the first eleven months of 2007 and 2009. The change in earnings is calculated 
for twenty separate industry-education cells, and reflects the combined impact of changes in 
employment, hours, and wages (Table 2B).
15 Not adjusted for inflation, total earnings declined 
for nearly all groups of workers with less than a college degree. Total earnings of workers with a 
high school diploma or more education rose between 2007 and 2009, but at a rate less than 
inflation. Total earnings increased for workers with a college degree in all six industry groups, 
but less than inflation in three of those. 
Fewer sets of results are calculated for the 2009 projected incomes. Partly this is a result 
of not being able to apply short-run rates to data that are themselves projected using changes in 
assets and income categories that are themselves functions of short-run rates of return. But, it is 
also the case since some of the tables and figures in the paper are driven by the demographic 
composition of the population, which is not modified in the projection to 2009.  
 
III. Results  
We begin by tracing how the addition of unrealized capital income changes the 
distribution of income, in both tables and figures. Then we look at after-tax income and finally 
examine levels and trends in various income percentiles and the share of final income that is 
                                                 
14 We also know that the distribution of housing wealth is not equally distributed across the population, but exhibits 
considerable regional variation (Carson and Dastrup, 2009). Because of the sample size and absence of sub-national 
geographic identifiers, we are only able to project an average change in housing wealth across the entire country. 
15 Changes in weeks worked between 2007 and 2009, because of temporary layoffs or furloughs, will not be 
reflected in our measure of earnings changes. 
  16either from wealth (capital) or labor. We also briefly explore the demographic profile of high-
MCI households. 
From SCF Income to MCI 
We begin with Table 2 and Figure 1 where we apply the long run rates of return to 
various asset types and chart the way in which this process changes mean and median income in 




th percentiles (and the Gini inequality measure). 
The numbers in Table 1 suggest that capital income makes a great deal of difference to correctly 
measured income in the United States. Of course, subtracting some capital income from SCF 
gross income (“less capital”) reduces the mean and median, but as we successively add wealth-
related income components, both measures change dramatically. Moving from SCF income to 
MCI, mean income rises by 31 percent and the median by 16 percent. The biggest changes come 
from stocks; imputed rent on owned homes; and business assets. Owned homes (“plus home”) 
affects large changes in both mean and median as housing is the quintessential ‘middle class 
asset’ and is the only capital income flow which significantly boost the median. Stocks and 
bonds (“plus finance”) and business assets (“plus business”) have larger affects on the mean due 




th percentiles rise by 49, 41 and 32 percent respectively in 2007 dollars from SCF to MCI. In 
contrast, the 10
th percentile increases only by 17 percent across these same measures. When we 
take into account, the changes in the medians, the relative inequality measures, the 99/50, 95/50 
and 90/50 ratios still rise by 28, 21 and 13 percent respectively. The 10/50 ratio is the same in 
SCF income and MCI. The correction of negatives and the subtraction of debts, reflected in the 
difference between ‘plus business’ and MCI, seem to have little effect on the overall results. 
In numerical terms, households at the 10th percentile of MCI have incomes of $14,397 
(Table 2) and net assets of $23,112 (Appendix Table 4). Income from wealth increases SCF 
  17income by only $2,057 at the 10
th percentile. This is in contrast with MCI and net worth values 
of $185,892 and $864,138 at the 90
th percentile, where capital income is $45,005 in 2007. At the 
median MCI level of $55,014, a household has a net worth of $152,491 and a gain of $7,709. 
However, at the 99
th percentile of MCI, where MCI is $1,031,528, net worth is over $6.5 million 
and SCF incomes in 2007 are increased by $338,000 in moving to MCI. Table 3 does the same 
with short run rates of return, with very similar results because short-run returns in 2006-07 are 
very close to the long-run rates. 
The dramatic nature and extent of these changes are easier seen in Figure 1. The mean 
and median values on the right side show steady increases, especially for “plus home” at the 
median where the appreciation of owned homes leads to a jump from one plateau to another. In 
contrast, the mean income rises steadily with big jumps as noted above and smaller changes at 
other definitional points. The 95
th and 90
th percentiles also rise relative to the median. The 
increases are most dramatic at the very top of the distribution where the bars show that the 99/50 
ratio starts below 15 for SCF income and rises to almost 19 for MCI, with the jump mostly due 
to business assets and “other investments.” Hence gains from income from wealth accrue largely 
to the very top of the income distribution, even after we re-rank incomes with each successive 
component of wealth (or finally, debt), and compare incomes to the median household.
16  
Table 3_09 shows the impacts of moving to MCI in the 2009 projected income – using 
long-run rates. The SCF incomes are very similar to levels from 2007, slightly lower at the mean 
and median and at the 99
th, 95
th and 90
th percentiles, but slightly higher at the 10
th percentile. 
                                                 
16 The MCI rich are similar to, but not the same as the ‘high income’ units studied by others. For instance, while 79 
percent of the same households are counted in the top one percent for both SCF income and MCI, 84 percent of the 
same units are in the top 10 percent. These percents have fallen over the past 18 years as well. In 1989, the overlap 
was 83 percent in the top centile and 89 percent in the top decile. Hence the top end of the MCI is increasingly 
divergent from the top end of the’ high income’ sample. As the value of assets continues to appreciate in the longer 
run, and as the fraction of income from capital grows relative to labor, we expect that the top centiles in each 
distribution will increasingly diverge.  
 
  18MCI incomes, however, are considerably lower for most groups in 2009. Moving from SCF 
income to MCI raises the mean and median by 27 and 15 percent, respectively, compared to 31 
percent and 16 percent in 2007. Adding in the imputed flows to equity in owner-occupied 
residential real estate (“plus home”) has very little impact on income at either the mean or the 
median, reflecting the huge national losses in housing values.  Moving to MCI raised the 99
th 
percentile by 43 percent in 2009, but 49 percent in 2007.  
Taxes 
  The after-tax changes, using 2007 SCF data, are summarized in Table 4. We employ the 
NBER TAXSIM model to estimate taxes, given existing, and advantaged, rates for taxable 
property income.
17 Indeed, while including taxes considerably reduces the incomes of high-
income households (MCI declines about $120,000 for the 99
th percentile after including taxes), 
the percentage gains from adding wealth are even greater in after tax terms at the highest income 
levels. The 99
th percentile of after tax income rises by 75 percent compared to a 49 percent 
change for the before tax incomes (Table 3). These results also confirm that after-tax inequality 
is lower than pre-tax inequality, with the 99/50 ratio for MCI (short-term rates) falling from 18.8 
to 16.4 after including taxes. The Gini index of MCI falls from .608 to .579 after taxes.
18  
Trends in Income Inequality for Key Income Definitions  
So far, we have discovered that at any point in time, accounting for income from wealth 
drastically increases both the level of income and the inequality of income. To see how the trend 
has evolved over the last 20 years, we calculate similar before tax figures for 1988-89, 1991-92, 
1994-95, 1997-98, 2000-01, and 2003-04.
19 We prefer the longer run rates when calculating 
                                                 
17 For a discussion of the TAXSIM model see Feenberg and Coutts (1993). 
18 We do not calculate the effects of ‘privileged’ types of taxable income (capital gains, dividends, and housing 
sales) on the composition of pre-tax income. 
19 Figures illustrating equivalent trends for after-tax income were included in previous draft, and are available from 
the authors. 
  19trends, but figures and tables using short-run rates are available from the authors. Results for 
these earlier years show much the same pattern as we saw above in 2006-2007 with few 
changes.
20 The six graphs in Figure 2 summarize the trend in key income definitions and 
component comparisons, using long run rates, over that period. First, MCI is at the top of every 
set of lines (except the 10/50 ratio where moving from SCF to MCI has little impact).  
While SCF and MCI follow similar patterns at the top of the distribution, the gap between 
MCI and SCF income is especially apparent for the 99/50 and 95/50 ratios and for the pattern of 
mean incomes. Thus, the trend in inequality is stronger with a more complete (vs. a less 
complete) income measure. At the bottom, we see that mean and median incomes both rise over 
the period for each income definition, with stagnant periods during previous recessions (early 
1990s and 2001), but outright declines in the current “great recession.” over the period. The 90-
50 ratios show little trend, suggesting most gains over the period are concentrated at the top of 
the distribution. The dips in the 99/50 ratio in 2003 and again in 2009 reflect the collapse of the 
stock (and housing in 2009) market in those periods. 
Adding imputed flows for financial wealth (“plus finance”) to income “less capital” 
leaves the 99/50 ratio very similar to SCF income. Adding housing wealth (“plus home”) 
produces little change in the 99/50 and 95/50 ratios, but accounts for the bulk of the change at 
the median (Panel F) and a large portion of the change in the mean (Panel E). The bulk of the 
gap between SCF income and MCI in the 99/50 ratio is a result of one of the final elements of 
MCI, imputed flows to business wealth. The relevance of business wealth shows up in the means 
(Panel E) and the 99/50 ratio (Panel A), but not the other trend statistics.
21  
                                                 
20 Data for years before 2007 are contained both in an earlier version of the paper, available at: 
http://www.irp.wisc.edu/aboutirp/people/affiliates/Smeeding/14-INCOME-FROM-WEALTH_6_21_07.pdf , as well 
as an additional series of data tables: http://www.irp.wisc.edu/aboutirp/people/affiliates/Smeeding/14b-Appendix-
tables-available-from-authors-Jun-7-2007.pdf. 
21 Equivalent figures using short run rates show essentially the same patterns. 
  20In general, the trends presented in Figure 2 suggest the effects of adding income from 
wealth follow a similar pattern of rising inequality as seen in the SCF income as well as other 
measures of income inequality over this period (e.g. Smeeding, 2005; CBO 2009). While 
inequality is higher in any given year for MCI income than SCF income, the 95/50 and 90/50 
ratios follow the same upward trend as the SCF income (Panels B, C). For the very top of the 
distribution, however, the inclusion of income from wealth results in a more dramatic rise in 
inequality (Panel A). The 99/50 ratio rises 57 percent between 1988-89 and 2006-07 in the SCF 
income measure, but it increases 64 percent for MCI. Therefore, while Wolff and Zacharias 
(2006a; 2006b) show that an augmented measure of wealth results in about the same rise in 
inequality as traditional measures of money income, our approach suggests that for the highest 
income households a more complete measure of income reveals a steeper growth in inequality.  
Projections to 2009 suggest that the run-up in inequality between 1989 and 2007 has been 
halted in the “great recession.” The 99/50 ratio declined from 18.8 in 2007 to 17.5 in 2009 using 
MCI and by a smaller amount using SCF income. Other MCI-based measures of inequality 
(Appendix Table 3) also declined over this period; the Gini index dropped from .608 to .600. 
Most of these measures, however, also show that inequality remains at high levels.   
Percentile Growth in Incomes  
  Figure 3 (Panels A and B) summarizes the 1989 to 2007 growth rates for SCF income 
and MCI across the entire distribution. The growth in MCI is greater than SCF income for all 
households above the 40
th percentile of the income distribution. Over most of the income 
distribution, the importance of moving to MCI appears to be roughly constant with the gap in 
growth rates fluctuating between 10 and 20 percentage points (Panel B). At the top of the 
distribution, however, the gap in growth rates increases dramatically. For the top three percent of 
the income distribution growth in MCI is more than 30 percent higher than SCF. For the 99
th 
  21percentile MCI growth was 35 percentage points faster than SCF income. Hence, the inclusion of 
income from wealth results in a rising inequality trend, when the measure of inequality contrasts 
the highest-income households with any other grouping. 
Tends in the Income Share of Top-Income Households 
There are several sets of estimated income trends amongst the rich to which we can 
compare our results. In Figure 4, we compare MCI shares of total income using long run rates to 
those found in three other studies: the Wolff-Zacharias (WZ, 2006a; 2006b) annuity value 
measures of income net worth; the CBO (2009) income after taxes and benefits including capital 
gains series; and those compiled in the ‘top income’ papers of Piketty and Saez (PS, 2003; 2007). 
We have plotted the shares, and have calculated the trends and the slopes of each line.  
  First we note that the top one percent shares using MCI are roughly in line with those of 
PS and WZ (Panel A). And, while Reynolds (2007) and Tatom (2007) have criticized the PS 
numbers because more of high income is not reported for tax reasons, our MCI measure avoids 
this problem, as we include unrealized and therefore untaxed income from wealth, and our shares 
are at least as high if not higher. For the top one percent, all lines rise over the period, suggesting 
an increase in share for either the 1989-2007 or 1989—2001 periods. For the 1989-2001 period 
MCI and PS had the steepest slopes for growth in the income share of the top one percent, well 
above the rates of increase in either the CBO or WZ figures. Between 1989 and 2007, though, 
the MCI slope was close to, but slightly smaller than, the CBO slope, and considerably smaller 
than the PS slope. To varying degrees, all of the series show a rising share at the very top. 
  For the next tier of top-income households – the 95
th to 99
th percentiles of the distribution 
(Panel B) – the PS and CBO series show relatively low growth over the period (1989-2001 or 
1989-2007). Using MCI, however, the income share of this group rises considerably, as does the 
  22WZ series for 1989-2001.  All of the series show slightly declining income shares for the next 
tier of top-income households – the 90
th to 95
th percentiles of the distribution (Panel C). 
  Based on the projections for 2009, MCI shows that the top income shares have declined 
slightly since 2007; the income share of the top one percent fell from 22.3 to 21.9 percent 
between 2007 and 2009, while the share of the next-highest four percent declined from 18.5 to 
18.0 percent. The crisis in the financial sector and the decline in business assets appears to have 
made a small dent in the income share of the highest-income households, but the shares remain 
higher than every year before 2007.   
Impact of Vehicle Service Flow 
  The levels and trends in MCI shown in tables 1, 2, and 3 and figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 do not 
impute any flow of income to vehicle assets below $50,000 in value. For low and middle-income 
households, however, vehicles are an important asset, and are typically valued well below 
$50,000. In 2007, median vehicle value was $13,000. Nearly 90 percent of households had 
vehicle assets, and the value at the 90
th percentile was under $41,000. Changing the treatment of 
vehicles in MCI, calculating an annual service flow to vehicle ownership following the approach 
of Slesnick (1994), suggests somewhat higher levels of MCI, particularly for low-income 
households.
22  Including vehicle service flow, MCI for at the 99
th percentile was $943,740 in 
2009, one percent higher than the baseline approach in Table 3_09. MCI at the 10
th percentile, 
though, was $15,538 with vehicle service flow, 5.2 percent higher than baseline MCI. Including 
vehicle service flows also modestly changes measures in the level of inequality, but has no 
appreciable impact on inequality trends. The Gini index of MCI in 2007, for example, falls from 
                                                 
22 The SCF includes a set of detailed questions about household vehicles, but in the public-use version of the data 
only includes the value of the vehicle. SCF staff calculate vehicle value based on the age, make, model, and 
condition of the vehicle. To calculate the vehicle service flow, we multiply the vehicle value by the rate of 
depreciation plus the rate of depreciation. Also following Slesnick (1994, 2001), we assume a rate of depreciation or 
10 percent. 
  23.600 to .593 after including vehicle service flow. The trend in the Gini index, though, is not 
affected (Figure 5, panel A). Adding vehicle service flow to MCI results in similar small changes 
in other inequality measures, including the income share of top five percent on households and 
the 99/50 income ratio, but leaves the overall trends unchanged (Figure 5, panels B, C).  
Labor vs. Capital Income  
A more complete accounting for income from wealth as well as from labor produces 
large changes in the functional income distribution. At the top of Figure 6 in Panel A, we see the 
SCF traditional micro-data based pattern of household income components. Earned income is 
63-70 percent of gross incomes over the period we study. Indeed most authors (e.g., Cowen, 
2007; Tatom, 2007) assume that labor income is always about 65-70 percent of total income. 
Conventional reported income from interest, rent, dividends and sometimes capital gains is 
between 10 and 15 percent of SCF income. “Other” (largely public transfer) net income is 9-15 
percent of gross income, while income from capital and Self Employment Business Income 
(SEBI) are both no more than 10 percent. This is the standard picture with almost all household 
income micro datasets, but the pattern is considerably different when we consider the MCI 
distribution (Panel B).  
Now, because we assess all capital income in MCI, capital income is both higher than in 
panel A, and is also growing from 1988-89 to 2006-07. The capital share of income in MCI rises 
from 30 to 40 percent over this period, with a recession induced dip in 1991-92 and plateau in 
2003-04, before falling back to 37 percent in the “great recession.” Over the same period, the 
labor share of income falls to 52 percent in 2006-07 percent, before bouncing back to 55 percent 
  24in 2009. “Other” (net transfer) income changes very little.
23 Using short-run rates (not shown) 
results in very noisy results that fail to show any trend between 1989 and 2007. 
These trends, especially using long-run rates, suggest the role of income from wealth is 
growing stronger in the US, while labor income is falling in importance. Simply put income from 
wealth rises and income from labor falls once we take a more complete view of Haig-Simons 
income.  
Labor Shares at the Top of the Distribution 
  Similar to Wolff and Zacharias (2006a; 2006b) we find that our expanded measure of 
income using the SCF fails to support Piketty and Saez’s (2003, 2006) finding of the rising 
importance of income from labor. Using federal tax return data, Piketty and Saez document a 
rising labor share of total money income for high-income households. Using the expanded 
income definition of MCI, we find that income from wealth represents the largest share of MCI 
at the top of the distribution and that the wealth share is rising.
24  
Figure 7 shows the share composition of MCI over the entire distribution. For the lowest 
MCI households labor and capital combined represent less than one third of total MCI in 2007, 
but for the highest MCI households capital income alone constitutes more than half of MCI 
(Panel A). The trend comparisons (Panel B) suggest that capital income represents the largest 
portion of MCI for the top few percentiles, and the capital share increased between 1989 and 
2007 for the top five percentiles. For the top one percent of the MCI distribution, the capital 
share rose from 39 percent of MCI in 1989 to 53 percent by 2007.  
                                                 
23 The estimates of labor share exclude the non-pension portion of total non-wage compensation. Adding  in 
employer subsides for health care , the one large and ignored element of compensation might reduce the trend 
slightly, but it would not change the qualitative conclusion that the long term  capital share is rising  
24 Lemieux, et al. (2007) describe how performance-based or incentive based pay has increasingly driven the income 
share of the top centime, but these same annual performance pay increases are no doubt also driving accumulated 
wealth at the tip of the MCI distribution in recent years, but with a one year or longer lag.  
  25The labor share of MCI, conversely, has declined at the top of the distribution. Figure 8 
shows the labor share of income for top-income households using both SCF Income (Panel A) 
and MCI (Panel B.) Using SCF income, the labor share of income the top one percent has risen, 
though not steadily, since 1989. Using MCI, the labor share declined between 1989 and 2007 for 
the top one percent as well as the next four percent, before rising in the “great recession.”  
Who are the Rich?  
The demographic profile of households by MCI class (Table 5) shows that, relative to 
other households, high MCI households are older, better educated, more likely to be white and 
married, more likely to be self-employed or in a partnership, and are disproportionately grouped 
in managerial and professional occupations. These facts seem to fit with a definition of what we 
loosely describe as “entrepreneurs.” Nearly 92 percent of households in the top one percent were 
headed by non-Hispanic whites and 92 percent were married, compared to nearly 69 percent and 
55 percent, respectively, for the bottom 90 percent of households.
25 Age alone is not a terribly 
good predictor of high wealth as nearly 42 percent of the group in the top 1 percent have children 
under age 18, little different from the bottom 90 percent of households.  
The educational and occupational differences between high MCI households and the 
general population are quite striking. Nearly 9 of 10 (87 percent) household heads in the top 1 
percent of MCI had at least a college degree compared to 30 percent among the bottom 90 
percent. Nearly half (47 percent) of working households in the top 1 percent of MCI had at least 
some post-graduate education.
26 Hence accumulation of human capital is indirectly linked to 
income from wealth. More than 88 percent of household heads in the top 1 percent of the MCI 
distribution were in the managerial and professional occupation class, and 45 percent were self-
                                                 
25 These relationships include legally married couples and other couples that are “partners.” 
26 Results in expanded tables available from the authors. 
  26employed or a partner in a firm, compared to just 34 percent and 8 percent respectively for the 
bottom 90 percent of the distribution. Moreover, nearly half (46 percent) of working households 
in the top 1 percent were self-employed/partner in a managerial and professional occupation.  
We conclude that high MCI households are a varied lot in certain respects, but they do 
appear similar to most definitions of ‘entrepreneurs’ based on education, occupational profession 
and industry. They are not especially aged and almost half of high MCI families still have 
children under age 18. Human capital is important to high MCI, but it has to be combined with 
creative risk-taking, in partnerships, self held businesses, high-level responsibilities and the 
ability to take advantage of economic opportunities that arise. 
  A more thorough treatment of demographics, including means, medians, and 
distributional breakdowns by age, family composition, and ethnicity for SCF income and MCI, 




IV. Discussion/Conclusion  
The story we are telling is one of shifting sources of incomes, especially at the top, from 
labor to capital income. It is not the same story as in the popular “high income” papers. High-
income families are not always high earners, as Piketty and Saez (2003; 2006) argue; rather it is 
that these high earners in earlier years consume relatively small fractions of these extremely 
large incomes and thus increasingly build up assets and accumulate high-unmeasured incomes 
from these assets. MCI brings out these patterns in some detail.  
Not unlike the Medici period in Italy, this “Richistan” (Frank, 2007) pattern is definitely 
at work in the early 21
st century where flat earnings below the 80
th percentile and falling median 
                                                 
27 Available at: http://www.irp.wisc.edu/aboutirp/people/affiliates/Smeeding/14-INCOME-FROM-
WEALTH_6_21_07.pdf. 
  27incomes for the non-elderly have drawn repeated questions about where the nation’s productivity 
gains have gone. (Gordon and Dew-Becker, 2005; Mishel et al, 2005; Lemieux, et al., 2007; 
Aron-Dine and Shapiro, 2006). The answer is that they went to, and remain in, higher value 
assets, including higher value corporate assets, proprietor’s incomes, net interest and profits 
(which drive up stock and bond market returns and the value of business equity).  
Institutional and economic change has created a greater emphasis on worldwide ‘free 
market’ capitalism, high returns to the entrepreneurs—the inventors and creative users of capital 
(Acemogolou, 2002). These changes have been combined with tax advantages for both capital 
income and high incomes, and have led to the worsening of the social and political position of 
labor more generally (Levy and Temin, 2007). All of these factors have contributed to the shift to 
higher capital vs. labor income. Ever greater global trade and further technological change 
should only intensify these changes (Blinder, 2007; Freeman, 2007). While some claim labor 
incomes will rise more in the future than will capital incomes due to world population aging 
(Krueger and Ludwig, 2006), others see high and rising returns to asset holdings for those with 
productive assets such as pension savings (Poterba, et al., 2007a; 2007b; Love and Smith, 2007). 
Indeed while human capital and technology are “racing” for higher income shares (Goldin and 
Katz, 2006), technology and the entrepreneurs who own and deploy such capital are currently 
winning the race, and are increasingly likely to receive higher rewards in a world of mobile 
capital and workers (see also Freeman, 2007). 
And, the US is not alone in this situation, as OECD figures reported by Porter (2006), 
Glynn, (2009) and Guscina (2006) suggest that the labor share of total income has fallen in most 
rich OECD nations over the 1990-2004 period. Indeed the labor share in Germany and Japan fell 
by even more than in the United States over this period, while at the same time; the German 
trend has been increasingly for market incomes to accrue to the highest income households 
  28(Bach, Corneo and Steiner, 2007). In addition, concentration of wealth is on the rise in Europe as 




  29Technical Appendix: Constructing MCI and Adding Taxes 
  Income net wealth (“income less capital”) is calculated by subtracting realized income 
from capital from the SCF income definition.
 28 Hence, reported interest, rents and dividends are 
excluded in the given income year. Further, capital gains and royalties are also excluded in 
counting income “less capital” to avoid double counting, as we will be imputing returns to these 
assets to the extent that these 2006 gains and royalties have been invested in other assets by 
2007. To the extent that these gains and royalties are consumed and not re-invested, we will 
underestimate capital incomes in this process. 
In allocating the functional share of income between labor and capital, and further in 
accounting for capital income flows, we partition self employment income as follows: in the 
cases where self-employment and business income (SEBI) exceeds income from wages, thirty 
percent of SEBI is considered a return to capital and is also subtracted from SCF income to 
complete “less capital.” In cases where SEBI is less than income from wages, we treat all SEBI 
as income from labor. This practice is the same as that employed by others who also split SEBI 
into labor and capital components (e.g., see Canberra Report, 2001). 
After removing income from capital from SCF income, flows to assets are imputed for 
the full range of assets measured in the SCF data. Separate rates of return were applied for 
stocks, bonds, and housing assets. Specific rates applied to the assets are based on historic 
returns data described in greater detail below. The return to stocks is based on the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. The return to bonds is based on 10-year US Treasury notes. The return to 
residential real estate is based on Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) 
House Price Index. In addition, flows to assets are calculated gross of the inflation rate (CPI-U), 
while some flows are based on the average of two different types of return (the average of the 
return to stocks and bonds, for example). The details are contained in Appendix Table A-1. 
The following additive series of combined capital income flows are added to income, net of 
reported interest rent and dividends, in the order specified below: 
                                                 
28 Three different versions of the SCF data for each year are used. The household income variable and many of the 
broader asset and income definitions as well as key demographic details are available in the “Extract of the Full 
Public Data Set” (in Stata) version of the SCF. This version of the data contains the variables used in Federal 
Reserve Bulletin article. Detailed asset classes not included in the extract file were accessed through the “Full Public 
Data Set” (in Stata). Key variables from the full data set were merged into the extract file. Finally, the full public 
access version of the data was accessed a second time in SAS. This was done because the SCF tax programs are 
coded in SAS. Use of the SCF tax programs and NBER’s TAXSIM is discussed in more detail below. (All of these 
versions are available at the SCF web site: www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html.) 
  30•  “plus finance” adds imputed flows to directly held stocks, stock mutual funds, 
combination mutual funds, bonds, other bond mutual funds, savings bonds, government 
bond mutual funds, and tax free bond mutual funds, as well as “other managed assets,” 
such as trusts and annuities to “income less capital”; 
•  “plus retire” adds flows to “quasi-liquid retirement accounts,” such as IRA/Keoghs and 
account-type pensions to “plus finance”; 
•  “plus home” adds flows to owner-occupied home equity to “plus retire”; 
•  “plus oth invest” adds flows to investment real estate equity, transaction accounts, 
certificates of deposit (CDs) and the cash value of whole life insurance to “plus home”; 
•  “plus business” adds flows to other business assets and vehicles―only vehicles worth 
more than $50,000―to “plus oth invest”; 
•  MCI subtracts flows to non real estate debt, including credit card debt, installment loans, 
and other debt from “plus business”―after replacing observations, where “plus 
business” value incomes were below SCF income with the SCF income value.
29 
 
  Separate estimates for each of these income concepts are created using both long-run (30-
year) averages and short-run (3-year) time specific rates. The long-run rates are based on the 
average annual return between 1977 and 2007, with the same long run rate applied to each year 
of SCF data―1989, 1992, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2004, 2007, and projections of the data into 2009.
30 
Short-run returns are averages of the three years leading up to the survey year. The short-run 
return for income year 1989, for example, is based on the annual average return between 1987 
and 1989. Income is from the completed calendar year prior to the survey. Assets are valued at 
the time of the survey, completed in the second half of the year. Imputed flows for 1989, for 
example, are based on wealth stocks reported between June and December of 1990
31. 
The long run nominal rates of return for stocks, bonds, housing and inflation are 7, 5, 6 
and 3 percent, respectively and are smaller than the 1977-2007 and 1989-2007 averages for this 
period. We believe that the long run rates are modest and we know that they reflect estimates 
used by others. For instance, the 4 percent real return for stocks (7 percent minus 3 percent 
inflation adjustment) is the same as that used by the Social Security Advisory Board to score the 
net effects of investing Social Security funds in the private equities market. Finally, we assume a 
                                                 
29 This adjustment was made on account of households with negative incomes even after imputation of flows to all 
assets. These households had large trust and royalty income, but experienced negative capital gains income that left 
them with relatively low (or zero) SCF income. When the trust and royalty income was subtracted from SCF 
income, the result was deeply negative income that dwarfed the imputed flow to their assets. This occurred in less 
than three percent of households in the 2003 data. The adjustment has little or no effect on the overall results. 
30 The actual long-run rates applied reduced the return to bonds and stocks by roughly 3.0 percentage points to 
adjust for annual rates of inflation. See Appendix Table 1 for details.  
31 Appendix Tables 1 and 2 include details for the long run and short-run rates of return applied to each income 
concept between 1989 and 2007. The year to year short run rates vary by period and asset type (see Appendix Table 
2).  
  31long run non-housing debt rate of 9 percent. Housing debt is factored in when determining net 
imputed rent on owned and other housing equity. 
 
Incorporating Taxes 
In addition to the MCI concepts described above, three additional after-tax income 
concepts are calculated for each year up through 2007. Taxes for all three are federal income 
taxes calculated using the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) TAXSIM program. 
All of the required input for TAXSIM is generated based on programs developed by Fed 
economist Kevin Moore, and is available on the NBER web site.
32  
The first after-tax concept is simply reported SCF income less taxes, a version of 
disposable personal income (dpi). The second concept is income net wealth and net taxes. 
Income net wealth is defined as described above (“less capital”) and the related taxes are 
calculated with TAXSIM by eliminating dividend and “other property” income, including 
interest, from the input file.
33 The final after-tax concept is based on MCI. In this case, the sum 
of the imputed flow to assets included in MCI is categorized as dividend income and the taxes 
calculated by TAXSIM.
34 The resulting federal taxes are subtracted from MCI to create “MCI 
less tax.”  
                                                 
32 The TAXSIM is available online at: http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/. 
33 These are fields 9 and 10 of the TAXSIM input file. 
34 In addition these results are also calculated with the imputed flows in MCI classified as “other property income” 
in TAXSIM. The impacts of this difference are minimal, and only present for 2004 and after. 
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                                      2006-III  Share  2009-IV  Share
National income $12,093 $12,466
Compensation of employees $7,484 61.9% $7,773 62.4%
   Wage and salary accruals $6,075 50.2% $6,266 50.3%
   Supplements to wages and salaries $1,409 11.6% $1,507 12.1%
Proprietors' income with inventory valuation and capital 
consumption adjustments
$1,131 9.4% $1,060 8.5%
Rental income of persons with capital consumption 
adjustment
$140 1.2% $287 2.3%
Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital 
consumption adjustments
$1,655 13.7% $1,468 11.8%
Net interest and miscellaneous payments $662 5.5% $783 6.3%
Taxes on production and imports less subsidies $992 8.2% $1,034 8.3%
Business current transfer payments $84 0.7% $128 1.0%
Current surplus of government enterprises -$5 0.0% -$7 -0.1%
 
Table 1. Relation of Gross Domestic Product, Gross National Product, and National Income - Including 
Those Accounted for in this Paper (shaded)
[Billions of dollars; quarters seasonally adjusted at annual rates]
Source: BEA NIPA Table 1.12, Available at www.bea.gov.
1. We account for supplements to wages and salaries only in so far as they appear as part of defined 
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retire








as % of 
SCF
mean 84,144 73,058 79,475 85,181 94,645 100,908 111,131 112,384 28,240 34%
median (P50) 47,305 43,808 46,214 47,602 53,070 55,196 56,858 55,917 8,612 18%
P90 140,887 128,546 135,625 149,259 167,868 179,678 189,333 189,740 48,854 35%
P95 206,702 185,106 200,865 218,977 245,110 265,998 294,841 295,743 89,041 43%
P10 12,340 11,369 12,340 12,340 14,234 14,402 14,503 14,398 2,058 17%
P99 693,121 516,327 613,923 679,215 754,758 842,751 1,040,259 1,062,867 369,746 53%
90/10 11.4 11.3 11.0 12.1 11.8 12.5 13.1 13.2 1.8 15%
90/50 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 0.4 14%
10/50 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.00 -1%
95/50 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.8 5.2 5.3 0.9 21%
99/50 14.7 11.8 13.3 14.3 14.2 15.3 18.3 19.0 4.4 30%
99/90 4.9 4.0 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.7 5.5 5.6 0.7 14%










 + imputed flow to primary residence
 + imputed flow to other residences and investment real-estate, transaction accounts, CDs and whole life insurance
 + imputed flow to other assets and businesses + imputed flow to vehicle wealth
 - imputed interest flow for remaining debt (after adjusting for negative incomes) 
Table 2. SCF (2006-07) - Full Income Definition Summary Statistics - Original Rankings and Short-run Rates of Return
change
Fed default gross household income definition, includes wages, self-employment and business income, taxable and 
tax-exempt interest, dividends, realized capital gains, food stamps and other support programs provided by the 
government, pension income and withdrawals from retirement accounts, Social Security income, alimony and other 
support payments, and miscellaneous sources of income.
SCF income less income from wealth (interest, dividends, rent, royalties, and income from trusts and non-taxable 
investments, including bonds, as well as some self-employment income).
 + imputed flows to stocks, bonds, annuities, and trusts















business MCI SCF to MCI
as % of 
SCF
mean 84,144 73,058 79,292 84,763 92,876 98,868 108,677 110,147 26,003 31%
median (P50) 47,305 43,808 46,157 47,444 51,997 54,488 55,768 55,014 7,709 16%
P90 140,887 128,546 135,571 148,855 163,986 175,709 184,423 185,892 45,005 32%
P95 206,702 185,106 200,588 218,850 241,284 259,486 287,293 290,835 84,133 41%
P10 12,340 11,369 12,340 12,340 13,839 14,397 14,407 14,397 2,057 17%
P99 693,121 516,327 611,309 669,215 728,744 822,229 1,011,830 1,031,528 338,407 49%
90/10 11.4 11.3 11.0 12.1 11.8 12.2 12.8 12.9 1.5 13%
90/50 3.0 2.9 2.9 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 0.4 13%
10/50 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.00 0%
95/50 4.4 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.6 4.8 5.2 5.3 0.9 21%
99/50 14.7 11.8 13.2 14.1 14.0 15.1 18.1 18.8 4.1 28%
99/90 4.9 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.7 5.5 5.5 0.6 13%









MCI  - imputed interest flow for remaining debt (after adjusting for negative incomes) 
Table 3. SCF (2006-07) - Full Income Definition Summary Statistics - Original Rankings and Long-run Rates of Return
change
Fed default gross household income definition, includes wages, self-employment and business income, taxable and tax-
exempt interest, dividends, realized capital gains, food stamps and other support programs provided by the 
government, pension income and withdrawals from retirement accounts, Social Security income, alimony and other 
support payments, and miscellaneous sources of income.
SCF income less income from wealth (interest, dividends, rent, royalties, and income from trusts and non-taxable 
investments, including bonds, as well as some self-employment income).
 + imputed flows to stocks, bonds, annuities, and trusts
 + imputed flows to quasi-liquid retirement accounts (401(k), IRA, etc.)
 + imputed flow to primary residence
 + imputed flow to other residences and investment real-estate, transaction accounts, CDs and whole life insurance



















as % of 
SCF
mean 82,298 71,322 78,891 83,597 88,381 94,396 102,221 104,303 22,005 27%
median (P50) 46,293 43,275 45,027 46,564 49,709 52,499 53,980 53,366 7,072 15%
P90 138,860 129,558 136,123 146,651 157,373 167,196 173,378 175,040 36,179 26%
P95 206,047 181,699 195,087 214,132 224,616 249,409 268,612 272,497 66,451 32%
P10 13,484 12,898 13,042 13,042 14,228 14,592 14,884 14,768 1,284 10%
P99 652,315 489,283 629,802 681,997 708,786 778,926 893,783 934,017 281,702 43%
90/10 10.3 10.0 10.4 11.2 11.1 11.5 11.6 11.9 1.6 15%
90/50 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 0.3 9%
10/50 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 -0.01 -5%
95/50 4.5 4.2 4.3 4.6 4.5 4.8 5.0 5.1 0.7 15%
99/50 14.1 11.3 14.0 14.6 14.3 14.8 16.6 17.5 3.4 24%
99/90 4.7 3.8 4.6 4.7 4.5 4.7 5.2 5.3 0.6 14%










 + imputed flows to quasi-liquid retirement accounts (401(k), IRA, etc.)
 + imputed flow to primary residence
 + imputed flow to other residences and investment real-estate, transaction accounts, CDs and whole life insurance
 + imputed flow to other assets and businesses + imputed flow to vehicle wealth
 - imputed interest flow for remaining debt (after adjusting for negative incomes) 
Table 3_09. SCF (2009 Projection) - Full Income Definition Summary Statistics - Original Rankings and Long-run Rates of Return
change
Fed default gross household income definition, includes wages, self-employment and business income, taxable and 
tax-exempt interest, dividends, realized capital gains, food stamps and other support programs provided by the 
government, pension income and withdrawals from retirement accounts, Social Security income, alimony and other 
support payments, and miscellaneous sources of income.
SCF income less income from wealth (interest, dividends, rent, royalties, and income from trusts and non-taxable 
investments, including bonds, as well as some self-employment income).





DPI to MCI 
lesstax




DPI to MCI 
lesstax
as % of 
DPI
mean 72,089 105,674 33,584 47% mean 72,089 103,260 31,171 43%
median (P50) 44,409 56,626 12,217 28% median (P50) 44,409 55,511 11,102 25%
P90 120,798 176,554 55,756 46% P90 120,798 171,887 51,089 42%
P95 172,232 277,522 105,290 61% P95 172,232 271,000 98,768 57%
P10 12,372 16,179 3,807 31% P10 12,372 15,962 3,590 29%
P99 520,282 925,758 405,475 78% P99 520,282 910,311 390,029 75%
90/10 9.8 10.9 1.1 12% 90/10 9.8 10.8 1.0 10%
90/50 2.7 3.1 0.4 15% 90/50 2.7 3.1 0.4 14%
10/50 0.28 0.29 0.0 3% 10/50 0.28 0.29 0.0 3%
95/50 3.9 4.9 1.0 26% 95/50 3.9 4.9 1.0 26%
99/50 11.7 16.3 4.6 40% 99/50 11.7 16.4 4.7 40%
99/90 4.3 5.2 0.9 22% 99/90 4.3 5.3 1.0 23%




income less federal taxes - calculated with TAXSIM
MCI less federal taxes - calculated with TAXSIM
*since dpi does not include any imputed flows to wealth, results are the same for short and long term rates of return
Table 4. After-Tax Concepts (2006-07)
Panel A. Short-run Rates of Return Panel B. Long-run Rates of Return
after-tax concepts change after-tax concepts change
 
  
(characteristics of household head)
Top 10% Top 5% Top 1% All Bottom 90%
Average age 53.4 55.3 56.6 50.0 49.6
Education Status
Average years of education 15.5 15.8 16.1 13.3 13.0
Share with at least college degree 76.7% 80.2% 87.3% 35.3% 30.2%
Household Status
Share of households headed by 
married couple or partners 86.9% 86.5% 91.7% 58.8% 55.3%
Share with any kids 46.8% 44.1% 41.5% 43.9% 43.6%
Average # kids (of those with kids) 1.90 1.91 2.04 1.9 1.9
Race
Share non-Hispanic White 86.9% 89.7% 92.0% 70.7% 68.7%
Share Black 2.7% 1.7% 1.8% 12.6% 13.8%
Share Hispanic 2.4% 1.7% 1.5% 9.4% 10.3%
Share "other" 8.0% 6.9% 4.7% 7.3% 7.2%
Working Status
Employed by someone else 53.3% 42.4% 37.7% 59.9% 60.7%
Self-employed or Partner 29.6% 41.3% 45.2% 10.5% 8.1%
Retired/Disabled/Student 15.8% 15.2% 16.2% 25.0% 26.1%
Otherwise not in labor force 1.3% 1.1% 0.9% 4.6% 5.1%
Industry
Agriculture 1.4% 1.4% 0.4% 3.0% 3.2%
Mining & Construction 7.7% 7.1% 12.3% 12.5% 13.2%
Manufacturing & publishing 10.5% 12.0% 9.5% 13.8% 14.3%
Trade, restaurants & bars 11.0% 10.4% 8.6% 15.2% 15.9%
Data, financial, business, repair & 
security svcs. 16.1% 19.2% 26.1% 12.0% 11.5%
Utility & transport, professional, 
scientific, technical, travel, cleaning, 
administrative, health, education, & 
personal svcs.
46.5% 44.8% 41.5% 36.3% 34.8%
Public admin. & armed svcs. 6.8% 5.1% 1.6% 7.1% 7.1%
Occupations
Executives, managers, scientists, 
architects, engineers, lawyers, 
teachers, counselors & social workers, 
health care practioners, techs. & 
support, entertainment, sports & media
75.7% 83.4% 88.4% 39.1% 33.6%
Technicians, sales, office & computer 
operators 13.1% 9.7% 9.5% 19.5% 20.3%
Protective svcs., food prep, cleaning & 
bldg svcs., personal care, armed svcs. 4.5% 3.1% 0.0% 11.5% 12.5%
Construction & skilled labor & crafts 4.0% 1.9% 1.0% 18.2% 20.3%
Unskilled labor 2.2% 1.3% 1.1% 10.5% 11.8%
Farm, fishing, forestry, animal training 
& care 0.5% 0.6% 0.0% 1.3% 1.5%














































































































































Figure 1. Full-income 2006-07 SCF -Long-run returns
90/50 50/10 95/50 99/50 mean median (P50)
 
  
Panel A. 99/50 ratios Panel B. 95/50 ratios
Panel C. 90/50 ratios Panel D. 10/50 ratios
Panel E. Means Panel F. Medians
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SCF income plus finance plus home MCI
 
 Panel A. Growth between 1989 and 2007 by percentile of SCF and MCI distribution (long-run rates)
Panel B. Difference in MCI and SCF Growth Rates by percentile






































































Panel A. Top one percent
Panel B. 95 to 99 ptile
Panel C. 90 to 95 ptile
NOTES:
1. MCI is based on long-run rates of return.
2. CBO uses a measure of "comprehensive income" that includes realized capital gains.
3. WZ is "wealth-adjusted" income from Wolff and Zacharias, May 2006.
4. PS2 is from Piketty and Saez, 2003. It includes capital gains.


























1989-2007:  MCI:  .95    CBO:  1.04 PS:  1.43






















MCI WZ PS CBO
Slopes
1989-2007:  MCI:  .47   CBO:  .11  PS: .18






















1989-2007:  MCI:  -.09    CBO:  -.06   PS: -.1 
















































 Figure 2. Labor and Capitol Shares (MCI Long-run Rates)
Figure 6. Labor and Capital Shares - SCF and MCI Gross Income





































 Smoothed 3 percentile averages using long-run rates
Panel A. Labor, Capital, and Other Share of MCI by percentile - 2007
Panel B. Labor and Capital Shares of MCI by percentile - 1989 and 2007



































































































rates 1977-07 1987-89 1990-92 1993-95 1996-98 1999-01 2002-04 2005-07 notes
SCF income Fed gross income
less capital SCF income less income 
from wealth (rent, interest, 
dividends, 
trusts&annuities)
SI 0.07 0.095 0.147 0.070 0.152 0.210 0.044 0.036 0.073
SIBI* 0.06 0.085 0.116 0.074 0.108 0.135 0.050 0.039 0.059
BI 0.05 0.076 0.086 0.078 0.065 0.060 0.055 0.043 0.045
CPI 0.03 0.042 0.043 0.040 0.026 0.021 0.025 0.026 0.035
plus retire + imputed flows to quasi-
liquid retirement accounts SI 0.07 0.095 0.147 0.070 0.152 0.210 0.044 0.036 0.073
plus home + imputed flow to primary 
residence HI 0.06 0.059 0.060 0.023 0.025 0.041 0.064 0.074 0.070
SI 0.07 0.095 0.147 0.070 0.152 0.210 0.044 0.036 0.073
CPI+1 0.04 0.052 0.053 0.050 0.036 0.031 0.035 0.036 0.045
BI 0.05 0.076 0.086 0.078 0.065 0.060 0.055 0.043 0.045
BICPI* 0.04 0.059 0.064 0.059 0.046 0.041 0.040 0.034 0.040
plus business + imputed flow to other 
assets and businesses + 
imputed flow to vehicle 
wealth
SI 0.07 0.095 0.147 0.070 0.152 0.210 0.044 0.036 0.073
MCI  - imputed interest flow for 
remaining debts (after 
replacing finc5 with SCF 
income when 
finc5<SCFincome) 
CPI + 6 0.09 0.102 0.103 0.100 0.086 0.081 0.085 0.086 0.095
Appendix Table 1. Rates of Return Applied to Different Portions of Full-Income
plus finance + imputed flows to stocks 
and bonds + imputed 
flows to annuities and 
trusts
* Average of SI and 
BI is for "combination" 
mutual funds, CPI is 
for tax-free bonds
plus oth invest + imputed flow to other 
residences and investment 
real-estate + imputed flow 
to transaction accounts + 
imputed flow to CDs and 
whole life insurance
*Whole life insurance 
is given BI rate, CDs 
are given average of 
BI and CPI
 









1989 6.0% 14.7% 8.6% 4.3%
1992 2.3% 7.0% 7.8% 4.0%
1995 2.5% 15.2% 6.5% 2.6%
1998 4.1% 21.0% 6.0% 2.1%
2001 6.4% 4.4% 5.5% 2.5%
2004 7.4% 3.6% 4.3% 2.6%
2007 7.0% 7.3% 4.5% 3.5%
B. "Long-run"* 6.0% 7.0% 5.0% 3.0%
*Rates used for 1988-89 to 2006-07
Appendix Table 2. Short Run (three-year average) and Long Run (1988-











Non‐taxable Investment Income NIPA. 2.1 (14) *SCF detail refers to bonds* ‐5.8%











CDs FOF. B.100(12) time and savings deposits 4.9%
Stocks FOF. B.100(24) corporate equities ‐21.6%
Stock mutual funds FOF. B.100(25) mutual fund shares ‐12.6%
Bonds FOF. B.100(18) treasury securities 404.2%
Other bond mutual funds FOF. B.100(21) corporate and foreign bonds 21.9%
Savings bonds FOF. B.100(17) savings bonds ‐2.5%
Govt. Bond Mutual Funds FOF. B.100(19) agency and GSE‐backed securities ‐83.7%
Tax‐free bond mutual funds FOF. B.100(20) municipal securities 9.2%
Combination and other mutual funds FOF. B.100(25) mutual fund shares ‐12.6%
Other (trusts, annuities, etc.) FOF. B.100(30) miscellaneous 10.8%
Home equity FOF. B.100(49) owner's equity in household real estate ‐41.0%
Quasi‐liquid retirement Urban Institute Analysis of FOF www.urban.org/retirement_policy/url.cfm?ID=411976 ‐14.0%
Transaction accounts FOF. B.100(11) (checkable deposits) 140.1%
Life Insurance FOF. B.100(27) life insurance reserves asset 3.8%
Nonresidential real estate FOF. B.100(49) owner's equity in household real estate ‐41.0%
Other residential real estate FOF. B.100(4) modify in same way as residential real estate ‐21.4%
Debt for other residential property FOF. B.100(33) home mortgages ‐1.3%
Other financial assets FOF. B.100(30) miscellaneous assets 10.8%




Vehicles FOF. B.100(7) consumer durables or miscellaneous assets 9.6%
Total debt FOF. B.100(31) total liabilities ‐1.4%
Mortgages and home equity loans FOF. B.100(33) home mortgages ‐1.3%














Agriculture, Fish, Forest, Construction -23.9% -13.1% -10.1% 4.9%
Manufacturing, Information, Publishing -21.4% -12.7% -9.3% 1.2%
Trade, Leisure, Restaurants -9.1% -3.4% -1.1% 2.2%
Utilities, Professional, Educational, Health Services -10.0% 2.0% 7.1% 6.9%
Data, Finance, Other Services -6.1% -0.8% -2.5% 2.7%
Public Administration -22.0% 3.4% 3.8% 9.4%
Appendix Table 2b. Change in Earnings between 2007 and 2009, by Education and Industry
Note: Earnings change figures estimated from Current Population Survey, Outgoing Rotation Group data, for January through 
November of 2007 and 2009. The education and industry groupings are based on the categories in the public SCF data. Earnings 
change is the difference between the cummulative weekly earnings for each industry/education cell in 2007 and 2009. Differencing 







1988-89 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01 2003-04 2006-07 2009_proj
99/10 ratio 50.5 40.9 45.3 54.2 71.7 63.0 71.6 63.2
99/50 ratio 11.5 10.2 10.4 13.5 17.4 15.6 18.8 17.5
10/50 ratio 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.28
gini 0.560 0.526 0.540 0.561 0.595 0.579 0.608 0.600
1988-89 1991-92 1994-95 1997-98 2000-01 2003-04 2006-07 2009_proj
mean 33.9% 35.8% 35.5% 38.0% 40.0% 45.2% 50.8% 40.9%
median 20.0% 21.9% 17.2% 19.6% 22.4% 21.9% 25.6% 20.8%
99th ptile 65.2% 58.1% 68.9% 77.0% 90.4% 104.2% 99.8% 78.3%
99/10 ratio 32.7% 29.9% 37.1% 41.2% 63.6% 69.7% 57.8% 59.1%
99/50 ratio 37.6% 29.7% 44.1% 48.0% 55.6% 67.5% 59.1% 47.6%
10/50 ratio 3.6% -0.2% 4.9% 4.6% -5.1% -1.3% 0.8% -7.2%
Panel A. MCI
1
Appendix Table 3. Basic Trends from SCF - Comparisons over time - Long run rates
1 MCI (more complete income) subtracts capital income (except realized capital gains) from Gross Income 
and adds back flows to assets and debt. 
2 SCF net some capital income takes Gross Income and subtracts interest, rent, dividends, and annuity 
and trust income, but retains realized capital gains.
For details on the definitions and rates used in developing Full Income see Tables 3 and 4.
Notes:
Panel B. % change bet SCF net some capital income to MCI
2
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by networth by SCF income by MCI
Addendum:        
MCI by percentile 
(short-run rates)
p10 11 68,039 23,112 25,664
p50 117,033 168,848 152,491 135,278
p90 870,988 876,835 864,138 761,991
p95 1,686,125 1,491,843 1,645,577 1,488,262
p99 6,252,244 5,607,287 6,509,146 6,443,411
Appendix Table 4. Values of networth by alternative rankings - 2007
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